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IN GOOD CONSCIENCE: THE LEGAL TREND TO
INCLUDE PRESCRIPTION CONTRACEPTIVES IN
EMPLOYER INSURANCE PLANS AND CATHOLIC
CHARITIES' "CONSCIENCE CLAUSE" OBJECTION
Kate Spota+
Imagine a woman running a routine errand in California: she enters
her local drug store, hands the pharmacist her prescription for a well-
known drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and
then is surprised to learn that her prescription is not covered under her
insurance plan. Upon inquiry with her religiously-affiliated employer-
one that provides health care benefits-she learns that this particular
prescription drug was the only one intentionally excluded from her
employee prescription plan. The woman must then decide between a
thirty-dollar out-of-pocket cost each month' or a change in her lifestyle
to obviate the need for the drug altogether.2 How did this situation
arise?
' J.D. Candidate, May 2004, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. I would like to thank my family and friends for all of their support. I would also like
to thank Professor Helen Alvard and Professor Lisa Everhart for their guidance
throughout the writing process.
1. Geraldine Sealey, Who Pays for the Pill? Women See Progress in Getting Birth
Control Covered by Health Insurance, at http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/
dailynews/birthcontrol1020619.html (June 19, 2002). Sealey noted, "Since the most
effective forms of birth control, such as the pill, are only available by prescription and can
be relatively expensive for some, a lack of insurance coverage can put contraception out of
reach for some." Id. A more long-term view estimates that "the average woman will
spend between $7,000 and $10,000 for birth control throughout her reproductive life."
Julie L. Hatcher, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.: Prescription for Equality in Insurance
Coverage, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 213 (2001) (citing 144 CONG. REC. S9181-01 (daily
ed. July 29, 1998) (statement of Sen. Snowe)). Cf Megan Colleen Roth, Rocking the
Cradle with Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.: Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Takes a Step
Forward, 70 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 781, 787-88 (2002) (citing a 1994 Women's
Research and Education Institute report that "women spend sixty-eight percent more
money on contraceptives than men spend"); Kathleen A. Bergin, Contraceptive Coverage
Under Student Health Insurance Plans: Title IX as a Remedy for Sex Discrimination, 54
U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 160 (2000) (noting an American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists study that found "[a] 15 percent increase in the number of oral
contraceptive users in a health plan would provide enough savings in pregnancy costs
alone to provide oral contraceptive coverage for all users in the plan").
2. See Memorandum from The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, to Interested
Parties, at http://www.covermypills.org (Aug. 7, 2002). This memorandum, regarding
"Latest Findings on Employer-Based Coverage of Contraception," reports that "[n]early
59 million women in the U.S. are of 'reproductive age,' between 16 and 44 years old....
Employer-based coverage is the primary form of health insurance for 64% of women of
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The drug described above is a prescription contraceptive. The legal
trend beginning with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
(EEOC) December 2000 decision3 and culminating in Erickson v. Bartell
Drug Co.4 found sex discrimination present where an employer did not
include prescription contraceptives in its otherwise inclusive prescription
insurance plan. Erickson was the first federal court case to hold that
these circumstances amounted to sex discrimination under Title VII.5
The case embraced an EEOC decision that found that Title VII protects
women by forcing their employers to include prescription contraceptive
coverage in employee health plans that cover nearly all other FDA
approved drugs.6 In so doing, Erickson evidenced judicial acceptance of
the controversial EEOC decision and formed the catalyst for the judicial
trend finding sex discrimination in these circumstances.
This trend, however, was recently challenged in California in Catholic
Charities of Sacramento Inc. v. Superior Court,7 where a religiously-
based employer appealed a decision denying injunctive relief from a
California statute" mandating that all employers who furnish a
prescription health insurance plan to their employees include
prescription contraceptives in that plan. 9 In an attempt to escape the
California statute, Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. (Catholic
Charities) raised arguments regarding its religious freedoms under the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of both the U.S. and
California Constitutions."' The California Court of Appeal found that
Catholic Charities' constitutional arguments failed, and ruled that
reproductive age, but a sizable minority of women lack coverage for contraceptives." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n (EEOC), Decision on Coverage of
Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000), at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/decision-contraception.html.
4. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1277 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (concluding that "the exclusion of
prescription contraceptives creates a gaping hole in the coverage offered to female
employees, leaving a fundamental and immediate healthcare need uncovered").
5. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176,
188 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2001.) (citing Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266
(W.D. Wash. 2001)).
6. Roth, supra note 1, at 789-90 (clarifying that "Title VII only affects employers
with fifteen or more employees").
7. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2001).
8. Women's Contraception Equity Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25
(Deering 2003); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (Deering 2003).
9. See Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 181.
10. Id. (describing Catholic Charities as a public benefit corporation and therefore,
implying that Catholic Charities properly fulfilled state action requirements by invoking
constitutional arguments against California's statutes).
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prescription contraceptives must be included in its employee prescription
drug plan."
An appeal is pending before the Supreme Court of California. If the
court resolves the case in favor of Petitioner, Catholic Charities could use
a "conscience clause" exception to the present legal trend that identifies
an employer's failure to include prescription contraceptives in its health
care plan as sex discrimination.'3 If the California Supreme Court affirms
the decision of the Superior Court denying Catholic Charities its request
for injunctive relief, the legal trend will become even more entrenched.
For now, the question remains unresolved."
This Note examines Petitioner's constitutional argument in Catholic
Charities v. Superior Court as applied to a California statute drafted with
a narrowly drawn "conscience clause" exemption. First, this Note
describes the background for Roman Catholic opposition to
contraceptives, and contrasts the reasons behind women's rights activists'
claim for equal access to contraception as a part of reproductive
freedom. Second, this Note examines the preeminent cases decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
and the California Supreme Court, as well as the relevant federal statutes
and administrative decisions used by the California Court of Appeal in
deciding Catholic Charities. Third, this Note describes in detail the
arguments advanced by the Petitioner in Catholic Charities and the
court's resulting analysis. Concluding that the Court of Appeal of
California correctly decided against the Petitioner in Catholic Charities,
this Note examines the possible impacts of that decision on society's view
of women and on the Catholic health care system. Finally, this Note
concludes that the California Supreme Court will affirm the appellate
11. Id. ("Because the statutes have a secular purpose, do not advance or inhibit
religion, and do not foster excessive government entanglement with religion, the
incidental effect of the statutes on religious beliefs does not violate the religious
guarantees of the United States and California Constitutions.").
12. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001)
(authorizing California Supreme Court review of the Catholic Charities case).
13. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1277 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
14. Susan Berke Fogel, Recent Trends and Policy Developments at State & National
Levels, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 216, 216 (2002). Fogel summarized her speech with
important questions surrounding the California Supreme Court's then upcoming ruling in
the Catholic Charities case. She concluded:
This is a case that's being watched by all of us. We have to ask, what is the
proper reach of the First Amendment? Should health care be a right? And if so,
would it trump the First Amendment? What kind of limits can we put on public
funds and still protect our religious liberties, which we all want to protect? Are
we going to let religion trump medical standards of care and let one religious
group take over our entire medical decision making?
Id. at 222.
2003] 1083
Catholic University Law Review
court's decision and hold that the mandatory inclusion of prescription
contraceptives in insurance plans, even for institutions whose religious
beliefs are contrary to the mandate, does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause or the Establishment Clause of the U.S. or California
Constitutions.
I. COMPETING RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS IN
THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTION CONTRACEPTIVES
AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
A. The Catholic Church's Opposition to Contraceptives." A Survey
Pope Paul VI's Humanae Vitae, or "Of Human Life,"' 5 written in 1968,
confirmed the Church's ban on artificial means of contraception." The
Church, through Pope Paul VI's encyclical Humanae Vitae, makes a
distinction between the unitive and procreative purposes of sex between
married couples. 7 In the Church's view, the act of sex between married
partners has a twofold purpose that cannot be separated: it brings the
couple together in an act of love symbolizing their depth of feelings for
one another (unitive purpose), and it provides an opportunity to bear
children (procreative purpose).' If these two elements are intentionally
separated, the Church believes that the natural structure of the sexual act
is missing and that it is improper.' 9  The doctrine espoused by the
15. POPE PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE , at para. 11 (1968), translated in JANET E.
SMITH, WHY HUMANAE VITAE WAS RIGHT: A READER 533 (1993); see THOMAS C.
Fox, SEXUALITY AND CATHOLICISM 68 (George Braziller ed., 1995). The author
describes Humanae Vitae as being "a sensitively written expression about the sanctity of
marital love and the need to nurture life in marriage .... [However,] it has been
remembered for only one thing: upholding.., the Catholic Church's ban on artificial birth
control." Id.
16. POPE PAUL VI, supra note 15, at para. 11. Paragraph eleven of Humanae Vitae
states: "IT]he Church, which interprets natural law through its unchanging doctrine,
reminds men and women that the teachings based on natural law must be obeyed and
teaches that it is necessary that each conjugal act remain ordained in itself to the
procreating of human life." Id. (Latin terms omitted); see also id at para. 11 n.11r
(recognizing that various translations have interpreted this sentence differently). The DSP
version states, "[The Church] teaches that each and every marriage act must remain open
to the transmission of life." Id.
17. Id. at para. 12. Pope Paul VI wrote, "[i]f both essential meanings are preserved,
that of union and procreation, the conjugal act fully maintains its capacity for [fostering]
true marital love and its ordination to the highest mission of parenthood, to which Man is
called." Id (Latin terms omitted).
18. FOX, supra note 15, at 75-76.
19. Id. at 76. The author summarizes the crux of Pope Paul VI's argument in
Hurnanae Vitae, stating that "[c]ontraception ... drastically alters the sacred balance
between the unitive and procreative in marriage." Id. Other religious scholars have
1084 [Vol. 52:108.1.
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encyclical remains in force in the Catholic Church today ° and influences
the dispute in the Catholic Charities case.2
drawn the Catholic Church's position on contraception directly from scripture. JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE CATHOLIC
THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTs 33-35 (1966). Noonan summarizes: "[T]he most obvious
and commanding message of the Old Testament is that marriage and the procreation of
children are eminently desirable human goods, which God has blessed." Id at 33. The
author also recognizes:
The Old Testament provides a structure which is basic to the understanding of
the Christian development of a sexual ethic. The structure may be resolved into
four propositions, elementary and of sweeping breadth. Woman is a person, like
man. Marriage is good, and is the ordinary state in which man and woman are
sexually related. Fecundity is good. Sexual acts are not necessarily good.
Id. at 30. Noonan cites several scriptural passages to emphasize the Old Testament's
message of fecundity in the context of marriage: Genesis 9:1, "God blessed Noah and his
sons, and said to them, 'Be fertile and multiply, and fill the earth"'; Deuteronomy 7:13-14,
"[God] will love and bless and multiply you; he will bless the fruit of your womb ... no
man or woman among you shall be childless"; Exodus 23:26, "[N]o woman in your land
will be barren or miscarry"; Ruth 4:11, "May the Lord make this wife come into your
house like Rachel and Leah, who between them built up the house of Israel." Id. at 31.
The most often quoted, and most controversial, scriptural passage from the Old Testament
regarding the contraception debate in the Church is Genesis 38: 8-10. Id. at 33-34. The
story in Genesis recounts when Onan was asked by his father to marry his deceased
brother's wife Tamar. But Onan "wasted his seed on the ground," to avoid contributing
offspring for his brother." At this, the Lord was displeased and "took his life." Genesis38:
8-10. The severity of this passage contrasts sharply with the rational emphasis on
procreation and marriage in Genesis, Deuteronomy, Exodus, and Ruth, and in passages of
the New Testament, and may be more of an anomaly than authoritative text. NOONAN,
supra note 19, at 35-36. Other biblical text either contradicts or distinguishes Genesis 38:8-
10: Leviticus 15:18 (man is "unclean" but not condemned because of an emission of seed),
Ezekial 18:6, Leviticus 18:19 (distinguishes coitus interruptus from a sexual act forbidden
by law under harsh punishment). Id. at 35. Noonan theorizes that "the lack of any
commandment, the contrast with other explicit regulations on marriage, the evident need
to restrain other forms of sexual misconduct-support the view that contraception is not
the act for which Onan was killed." Id.
20. JANET E. SMITH, Paul VI as Prophet, in WHY HUMANAE VITAE WAS RIGHT: A
READER 520-21 (1993) (maintaining that Pope John Paul VI's predictions were true). But
see Fox, supra note 15, at 77-78 (reporting concern among the Catholic community
regarding Humanae Vitae's message). Upon its publication, Humanae Vitae drew some
concern and dissenting views from Catholic followers, particularly in Washington, D.C.,
where a group of Catholic scholars disagreed with the views espoused by Pope Paul VI.
Id. They organized primarily on the campus of The Catholic University of America in
Washington, D.C. and publicly voiced their concerns with the Pope's ban on artificial
contraception. Id. at 77-79. They believed "'spouses may responsibly decide according to
their conscience that artificial contraception in some circumstances is permissible and
indeed necessary to preserve and foster the values and sacredness of marriage."' Id. at 78.
21. See Fox, supra note 15, at 82-83. Fox notes, "It is easy... to forget that all other
Christian religions along with most people in the Western world held that contraception
was wrong up until the nineteenth century." Id. Many theologians speculate that the
Church's resistance to change is based on various factors including:
One, by the twentieth century the Catholic Church had developed a theological-
ethical theory that explained in a systematic way its total teaching with regard to
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Pope John Paul 11 wrote Evangelium Vitae, or "The Gospel of Life,"
in 1995 and taught that civil law and moral law should coincide on issues
regarding human life.22 Recognizing that this union does not always
exist, such as with laws legitimizing abortion and euthanasia, the Pope
sent a message of conscientious objection to the Catholic community. 2 3
This message bears directly on the Catholic Charities case, in which a
Catholic organization protested against a California statute imposing
contraceptive coverage on employer insurance plans because the
statute's mandate directly opposed Catholic moral teachings.24
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) released its
"Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services" in
1994 and, among other health care issues, specifically directed Catholic
health service providers to follow the Church's teachings regarding
contraception and abortion. 5 In particular, one directive under the
sexual morality. The purpose of sexuality is procreation (and later love union),
which means that sexuality must be restricted to marriage and that every single
act of sexuality must be open to procreation. This provides the rationale for the
acceptance of the generally held Catholic moral beliefs that extramarital
intercourse, homosexuality, masturbation, and artificial contraception are always
wrong. This systematic theory thus provides a basis for the whole understanding
of sexuality. Seen as a systematic whole, to change positions on any one of these
beliefs might be viewed as potentially opening the church to changes in other
teachings. Two, the Catholic Church, with its great emphasis on tradition, always
finds it difficult to go against what has been proposed in the past. Three, the
Catholic Church .... often saw itself in opposition to the modern world .... It
was easy to cast contraception as simply one more evil creeping into modern
society .... Four, by the time Humane Vitae became public it had become not
just a morality question but also an essential authority question .... How could
the Holy Spirit allow the church to have been wrong?
Id. at 82-83.
22. Pope John Paul I1, Evangelium Vitae, para. 68-77 (1995). The Pope believed
"there is a need to recover the basic elements of a vision of the relationship between civil
law and moral law, which are put forward by the Church, but which are also part of the
patrimony of the great juridical traditions of humanity." Id. para. 71. Pope John Paul II
summarized that "[tjhe doctrine on the necessary conformity of civil law with the moral
lawis in continuity with the whole tradition of the Church." Id. para. 72. The Pope quoted
Summa Theologiae as supporting his proposition. Id.at n.97 ("Every law made by man
can be called a law insofar as it derives from the natural law. But if it is somehow opposed
to the natural law, then it is not really a law but rather a corruption of the law.").
23. Pope John Paul It, supra note 22, para. 73; THE ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II
780 (J. Michael Miller, C.S.B., ed., 1996) (providing a synopsis of the Pope's teachings on
the moral foundation of civil law). Regarding abortion and euthanasia laws, the Pope
declared, "There is no obligation in conscience to obey such laws; instead there is a grave
and clear obligation to oppose them by conscientious objection." Pope John Paul II, supra
note 22, para. 73. The Pope continued that "it is ... never licit to obey [such a law]." Id.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (1994), at http://www.mergerwatch.org/
1086 [Vol. 52:1081
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subtitle "Issues in Care for the Beginning of Life" reads: "Catholic health
institutions may not promote or condone contraceptive practices but
should provide, for married couples . . . instruction both about the
Church's teaching on responsible parenthood and in methods of natural
family planning."26  These directives impact the instant case. As a
Catholic social services provider, Catholic Charities was bound to followNCCB .. 27
NCCB policies and, therefore, faced a conflict when a California statute
contradicted its religious directives. 2s This conflict resulted in litigation
before the California Superior Court.
B. Access to Prescription Contraceptives A Feminist Perspective
Much of the debate29 surrounding women's right to prescription
contraceptive coverage focuses on the analogy between men's access to
Viagra, a drug used to combat impotency, and the denial of equal access
to women for birth control pills." This analogy is necessary because
religious/exerpts.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). The Directives state, "Catholic health
care services must adopt these Directives as policy, [and] require adherence to them
within the institution as a condition for medical privileges and employment." Id. at No. 5.
26. Id. at No. 52.
27. See Carol Hogan, Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. vs. the State of
California: The Events, the Case, and the Implications, available at
http://www.cacatholic.org/ncbcarticle.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2003). Hogan writes, "It is
illicit for Catholic Charities, as a part of the Catholic Church in the Diocese of
Sacramento, to provide contraceptive coverage to its employees, and it is immoral to
deprive their employees of pharmaceutical benefits in order to avoid the conflict." Id.
28. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 176, 184
(Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2001) (describing the "dilemma" faced by Catholic Charities).
29. Cover My Pills, Planned Parenthood Files Unprecedented Sex Discrimination
Lawsuit Employer's Refusal to Provide Insurance Coverage for Contraceptives Unlawful
and Unfair, at http://www.covermypills.org/latest/index.asp?id=l (July 19, 2000). Planned
Parenthood Federation of America argues that prescription contraceptives are a basic and
essential element of women's health care. Id It cites statistics including, "[s]even in [ten]
American women in their childbearing years are sexually active and do not wish to
become pregnant." Id The article states that without the option of prescription
contraceptives at a reasonable price, women in this group are forced to rely on less
effective means of contraception, which leads to unwanted pregnancy and its associated
financial and health costs. Id. Public opinion surveys show that a large majority of those
polled would support coverage of contraceptives in their insurance plans, even if it meant
a five-dollar increase in costs per month. Id.
30. Amy Argetsinger & Avram Goldstein, G WU to Cover Birth Control in Student
Health Plan, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2002, at B1. The authors write, "Historically,
women's health has been given second-class status . . . . What brought this [issue
surrounding sex discrimination and prescription contraceptive coverage] to everyone's
attention is that as soon as Viagra came on the market, health insurance started covering
it, and women said: 'What is this? Why don't you cover my pills?"' Id. (quoting Dina
Lassow of the Women's Law Center). Another popular argument, and the one used by
the EEOC in its December 2000 decision, views pregnancy as a preventable medical
condition and therefore, finds the exclusion of prescription contraceptives from insurance
2003] 1087
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insurance plans have not only refused to cover women's birth control
pills: men would also be denied coverage if a comparative contraceptive
was available.3' To argue that employers are unfairly denying women
access to prescription contraceptives would be to draw attention to the
inequity in insurance plans that include Viagra for males while excluding
prescription contraceptives for females.32
A popular argument in support of this analogy views women's access
to prescription contraceptives as enabling them access to the sex act
itself." Author Sherry Colb proposes, "If we understand sexual
intercourse as an activity that women might choose to forego, then it
becomes clear that what birth control primarily does is facilitate sexual
activity for women, not [sic] rather than prevent pregnancy. 3 4  If
prescription plans allow men access to Viagra, a drug designed to
facilitate male sexual activity, then the exclusion of prescription
contraceptives, when viewed as an avenue to a sexually active lifestyle
plans impermissible. EEOC Decision, supra note 3; cf infra Part llI.B (describing the
EEOC decision).
31. See Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73
WASH. L. REV. 363, 370 (1998) (stating that "[tihere is no FDA-approved contraceptive
pill for men"). Law relies on an article by Christina Wang and others to describe the
problems with an oral contraceptive for men, including "lower efficiency in Caucasian
men, the need for several months of treatment before the effects are induced, and
relatively high cost." Id. at 370 n.36. But see Kathy George, Male Birth-Control Pill
Studied (Nov. 20, 2002), at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/96391.malepil120.shtml (last
visited Aug. 31, 2003). Dr. William Bremner, director of the University of Washington
Male Contraception Research Center, believes "[r]esearch in the field [of male
prescription contraceptives] has moved slowly . . . because society as a whole . . . still
believe[s] that preventing pregnancy 'is really a female issue."' Id
32. Sherry F. Colb, Denial of Birth Control Insurance as a Form of Sex
Discrimination: What "Male" Drug is Most Similar to Birth Control Pills? Female Birth
Control, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer - friendly.pl?page=/
colb/20010103.html (Jan. 3,2001). The author states, "The policy is formally gender-blind:
Anyone who wants birth control pills is denied coverage." Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also Kim H. Finley, Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Viagra?
Demand for "Lifestyle" Drugs Raises Legal and Public Policy Issues, 28 CAP. U. L. REV.
837, 839 (2000) (identifying insurance coverage of Viagra as an opportunity for women to
argue for coverage of prescription contraceptives); Kathryn Kindell, Prescription for
Fairness: Health Insurance Reimbursement for Viagra and Contraceptives, 35 TULSA L.J.
399, 414-18 (2000) (arguing that contraceptives are medical necessities).
35. See Sibley-Schreiber v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 979 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss in a class action suit for the wrongful denial
of insurance coverage for Viagra on grounds that the plaintiffs satisfied their obligation to
exhaust administrative remedies, but allowing the action to proceed under a claimed
violation of ERISA); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000) (stating "every employee benefit
plan shall ... afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits
has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the
decision denying the claim").
1088 [Vol. 52:1081.
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for women, 36 appears discriminatory.37 Popular support for prescription
contraceptive coverage, along with economic, social, and gender equality
arguments, form the basis of the opposing view in Catholic Charities.38
II. CONTRACEPTION RULINGS UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF TITLE VII
A. Historic Legal Approaches To Obtain Freedoms for Women:
Reproductive Freedom and Gender Equality
1. A Background of Reproductive Freedom Law
Over time, the Supreme Court has weighed in on several influential
female reproductive rights cases.39  Beginning with Griswold v.
Connecticut, where married persons were found to have a constitutional
right of access to contraception, the Court has been laying the
groundwork for reproductive freedom for women.4' In Griswold, the
36. Colb, supra note 32. The author theorizes:
Though birth control does not literally make sexual intercourse
possible, the way Viagra does, it is similar in that it gives women access
to this activity even when they wish to avoid pregnancy. The failure to
cover birth control has, for this reason, signified for many a hostility to
women's sexuality.
Id.
37. Id. The author, Sherry Colb, argues that viewing prescription contraception as
the means to a healthy and active sexual life for women, rather than as preventative
medicine, is more akin to the feelings women have about their need for the drug and,
therefore, a more persuasive argument. Id. Opponents to this argument view prescription
contraceptives as a "lifestyle" choice and, therefore, oppose insurance coverage. Abigail
Trafford, Viagra and the Other Sex Pill, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998, at Z6. The author
queries, "Why should health insurers foot the bill for what is a personal, rather than a
medical, decision?" Id.
38. 143 CONG. REC. S4487 (daily ed. May 14, 1997) (statement of Sen. Snowe).
Senator Snowe commented that, "women spend 68 percent more than men in out-of-
pocket health care costs .... It does not make sense that, at a time when we want to
reduce unintended pregnancies, so many otherwise insured woman [sic] can't afford access
to the most effective contraceptives because of the disparity in coverage." Id
39. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985). The court
opined:
The right to marriage and procreation are now recognized as fundamental,
constitutionally protected interests. So too, is the right of a woman to choose not
to bear children, and to implement that choice by use of contraceptive devices or
medication, and, subject to reasonable restrictions, to terminate a pregnancy.
These rights are aspects of the right of privacy which exists within the penumbra
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
40. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
41. Id. at 485-86. The executive and medical directors of the Planned Parenthood
League of Connecticut were convicted for violating a Connecticut statute prohibiting the
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Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that "operate[d] directly on an
intimate relation of husband and wife., 42  The Court concluded its
opinion with a poetic definition of the institution of marriage and
affirmed a married couple's right to privacy, which included access to
contraception, within the bounds of their marriage.
43
Next, the Court expanded the right of access to contraception to
unmarried persons. 4  In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court
invalidated a Massachusetts statute that forbade the sale, loan, or gift of
any contraceptive, except to married couples. 4 The Court found that the
statute treated persons in the same situation differently in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 46 It held
that "the statute, viewed as a prohibition on contraception per se" was
unconstitutional47 and found no rational basis for distinguishing between
contraceptive rights of married and unmarried couples.
The most widely known cases on reproductive rights are Roe v. Wade 9
and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.5 ' In Roe, the Court concluded that a
woman's right to an abortion is either a constitutional right based on the
Ninth Amendment or a liberty right under the Fourteenth Amendment.5
In Casey, Justice O'Connor wrote that the legality of abortion reflected
use of contraceptives. Id. at 480. The medical personnel gave information, instruction, and
advice on contraception to married couples. Id
42. Id at 482. The Court added that, "in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather
than regulating their manufacture or sale, [the statute] seeks to achieve its goals by means
having a maximum destructive impact on that [marital] relationship." Id at 485.
43. Id. at 486. The Court wrote, "Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects." Id.
44. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972).
45. See id at 440-41, 443. The statute forbade anyone from "giv[ing] away ... any
drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of conception," except
for a medical professional dispensing such contraceptives to married couples. Id. After
the appellee gave a speech on the necessity of contraception at Boston University, he
personally handed contraceptive foam to an audience member and was subsequently
arrested for violating the Massachusetts statute banning the use of contraceptives among
unmarried persons. Id The appellee was not a licensed physician as required under the
statute. Id
46. Id. at 443; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
47. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443. The Court asserted enforcement of the statute would
"materially impair the ability of single persons to obtain contraceptives." Id at 446.
48. Id, at 450. The Court invalidated an argument that the statute served health
purposes because "[i]f there is a need to have a physician prescribe.., contraceptives, that
need is as great for unmarried persons as for married persons." Id.
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (noting that the impact of denying women the choice to
control their own reproductive processes could lead to "a distressful life and future").
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the majority's belief that "[t]he ability of women to participate equally in
the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives. 5 2 This line of reasoning has
been followed in important cases involving reproductive rights and
contraceptive coverage."
Similarly, Conservatorship of Valerie N.14 was a defining case
regarding reproductive rights heard by the Supreme Court of California,
the same court that will hear Catholic Charities' pending appeal.55
Valerie N. addressed the right of a conservator to impose sterilization 56
upon a mentally disabled conservatee.57 Most relevant to this Note, the
court held that the California statute' 8 precluding all conservators from
arranging sterilization procedures for their conservatees was
unconstitutional, given the rights that "are accorded all other persons
[under] . . . state and federal constitutional guarantees of privacy.""
Specifically, the court held that both the federal and the California
52. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
53. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272-73 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(holding that Title VII requires employers to provide comprehensive prescription
insurance plans that include contraceptives); see also Catholic Charities of Sacramento,
Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 182-83 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2001) (denying a
constitutional challenge to a narrowly-drawn "conscience clause" and mandating that an
auxiliary religious organization include prescription contraceptives in its employee drug
plan).
54. 707 P.2d 760,762 (Cal. 1985).
55. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001).
56. Valerie N., 707 P.2d at 765. ("[Ais a "pioneer" in the field, California performed
the greatest number of sterilization operations ... [and] [t]he total number of operations
performed to date is more than 5,000, which is four times as many as have been performed
for eugenic reasons, in governmental institutions, in all the rest of the world together, so
far as known."). In her article, author Megan Colleen Roth notes that "sterilization is
considered to be the most common form of contraception in the United States.
Sterilization ... is virtually irreversible ... [y]et, sterilization is covered by most insurance
policies, possibly explaining its appeal." Roth, supra note 1, at 786 (footnotes omitted).
57. Valerie N., 707 P.2d at 773-74 (framing the issue as "whether withholding the
option of sterilization as a method of contraception to this class of [mentally disabled]
women is constitutionally permissible"). Valerie's mother and stepfather petitioned for
authorization to have Valerie sterilized. Id. at 762-63. Evidence showed that Valerie had
a history of "'inappropriate' sexual advances toward [men]" including when she
"approached men [on the street], hugged and kissed them, climbed on them, and wanted
to sit on their laps." Id. at 763.
58. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (Deering 2003). California's Welfare and
Institutions Code § 2356(d) states, "No minor may be sterilized under this division." Id.
59. Valerie N., 707 P.2d at 762 (holding also that "[t]he judgment must be affirmed
because the record does not support a conclusion that sterilization is necessary to Valerie's
habilitation and does not support the trial court's implicit conclusion that less intrusive
means by which to avoid conception are unavailable to Valerie").
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Constitutions protected the right to use contraception.6 °  Although
addressing a woman's right to procreate, rather than a woman's right not
to procreate, the Valerie N. ruling impacted directly the legal issue
discussed in Catholic Charities because it reinforced the idea of
61
reproductive freedom.
2. A Background of Gender Equality Law
Several landmark cases involved religious organizations, gender
equality, and conscience clause arguments. 61 In 1986, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided EEOC v. Fremont Christian
School.6' That case involved a private school's policy to provide health
insurance coverage to only those employees falling under the category
"head of household." 6 As used, the term "head of household" meant
single persons or married men, and excluded married women. 6 Based on
its determination that Fremont Christian School's policy discriminated
against women, the court affirmed the EEOC's motion for partial
summary judgment.66  Further, an injunction precluded Fremont
Christian from unequal compensation of its married male and female
employees. 6' Additionally, the court declined to grant Fremont
Christian's statutory and First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
68arguments; instead it affirmed the district court's ruling. The district
60. Id. at 771-72 (basing its decision on the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution).
61. See id.
62. See e.g., EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1364. Fremont Christian School is owned by the Assembly of God Church
in California, a religion that believes the Bible should be interpreted literally. Id. The
tenets of the Assembly of God Church include the belief "that in any marriage, the
husband is the head of the household and is required to provide for that household." Id.
65. Id. at 1365. The court noted that, "the test for routine eligibility for health
insurance for women is whether they are married. If so, the husband is presumed to be
the head of the household, rendering women ineligible for health benefits." Id. Fremont
Christian School sometimes granted a limited exception from its employee insurance
policy for married female employees. Id. The school would permit health insurance
coverage for the otherwise excluded married woman as an "act of Christian charity" when
a female employee's spouse was either a full time student or was disabled or ill, therefore,
preventing him from providing for his family. Id.
66. Id. at 1370.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 1365, 1367. Freemont Christian School argued that an applicable exception
exists under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982). Id. at 1365. However, the court cited relevant
case law to invalidate the school's claim. Id. at 1366. The court held that "religious
employers are not immune from liability [under Title VII] for discrimination based on ...
sex . . . ." Id. (quoting EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n., 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th
Cir. 1982)). The court stated:
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court held that "the existence of a strong compelling state interest in
eradicating discrimination, coupled with the fact that eliminating the
employment policy involved here would not interfere with religious
belief, and only minimally, if at all, with the practice of religion., 69 By
invalidating Fremont Christian's policy, the court recognized the need to
extinguish gender inequality in the workplace, thereby setting the stage
for Catholic Charities.
B. A Background of Religious Exemption Arguments
In addition to important gender equality decisions, courts have ruled
upon various religious exemption--or "conscience clause" -arguments.
In United States v. Lee,70 the appellee argued before the U.S. Supreme
Court that freedom of religion under the Free Exercise Clause permitted
him a refund of the portion of taxes he paid to the Internal Revenue
Service.71 Rather than attempting to interpret and validate the appellee's
To determine whether a neutrally-based statute, such as Title VII or the [Equal
Pay] Act, violates the free exercise clause, this court weighs three factors: (1) the
magnitude of the statute's impact on the exercise of a religious belief; (2) the
existence of a compelling state interest justifying the burden imposed upon the
exercise of the religious belief; and (3) the extent to which recognition of an
exemption from the statute would impede objectives sought to be advanced by
the statute.
Id. at 1367.
69. Id. at 1364. As in Catholic Charities, the appellant used constitutional arguments
under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses to shield itself from a court-imposed
injunction. Id. at 1367-70. The court denied both arguments. Id at 1370. Addressing the
Free Exercise argument, the court found that imposing Title VII protections against sex
discrimination would help enforce appellant's belief that treating women unfairly would
constitute "sin." Id. at 1368. Therefore, enforcement of Title VII could not have a
"significant impact on Fremont Christian's religious beliefs or doctrines." Id.; see also
infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (abandoning the Sherbert balancing test).
Similarly, in addressing appellant's Establishment Clause argument, the court used the
three-part Lemon test to conclude that there was no excessive government-church
entanglement. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d at 1369-70; see also infra Part IV.C
(discussing the Lemon test in the Catholic Charities case). Under part one of the Lemon
test, the court found that appellant did not qualify under the McClure exemption for
ministers. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d at 1369-70; see also McClure v. Salvation
Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972). The appellant failed part two because EEOC
enforcement does not have "[t]he potential for ongoing entanglement or continuous
supervision" even when a court imposed injunction is involved. Fremont Christian Sch.,
781 F.2d at 1370 (quoting EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n., 676 F.2d 1272, 1282
(9th Cir. 1982)). Part three similarly failed because the "EEOC's relationship to religious
employers threatens no more entanglement than other statutes which regulate employee
compensation at religious institutions." Id.
70. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
71. Id. at 254. The appellee employer, a member of the Old Order Amish, failed to
file social security tax returns, to withhold the necessary social security taxes from his
Amish employees, or to provide his portion of social security funds as required as their
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12Free Exercise claim, the Court took the claim at face value . Further,
the Court found that the obligation to pay taxes into the social security
system did burden appellee's religious freedoms, but found that the
burden did not violate constitutional protections under a strict scrutiny
analysis.73  The government proved that its interest in providing
retirement and health insurance benefits for the country's elderly
population, by requiring mandatory payments into the social security
system, overcame the burden on the appellee's religious freedoms under
the First Amendment. 4 As the Court noted, finding otherwise would
"unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest."75
employer. Id. The appellee believed that doing so would violate his religious belief that
there is an obligation to provide for the Amish elderly outside of using the Social Security
system. Id. at 255 n.3 (quoting Timothy 5:8 as stating "[b]ut if any provide not... for those
of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel"). He argued that
these Free Exercise rights extended to his Amish employees as well. Id. at 255. In fact,
the appellee actually paid ninety-one dollars of the total $27,000 owed and then demanded
a refund. Id. at 254-55 & n.2 ("Appellee also requested injunctive relief to prevent the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue from attempting to collect the unpaid balance of the
assessments."). The lower court used a statutory "conscience clause" exception for
religious objectors to find the statutes at issue unconstitutional. Id. at 255. The court then
cited 42 U.S.C. § 1402(g), which reads in relevant part:
(1) Exemption - Any individual may file an application . . . for an exemption
from the tax imposed by this chapter if he is a member of a recognized religious
sect or division thereof and is an adherent of established tenets or teachings of
such sect or division by reason of which he is conscientiously opposed to
acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insurance which makes
payments in the event of death, disability, old-age, or retirement or makes
payments toward the cost of, or provides services for, medical care (including the
benefits of any insurance system established by the Social Security Act).
Id. at 255-56 n.4. Upon review, the Supreme Court summarily excluded the
applicability of the section 1402(g) exception because it only applies to self-employed
persons, a category into which appellee did not fall. Id. at 256.
72. Id at 257; see Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 716 (1981) (stating that "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation").
73. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58. Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[t]he state may
justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an
overriding governmental interest." Id The Court relied on precedent to reach its
determination. Id. (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
74. Id. at 258 (recognizing that "mandatory participation is indispensable to the
fiscal vitality of the social security system"). The Court stated, "To maintain an
organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths
requires that some religious practices yield to the common good. Religious beliefs
can be accommodated, but there is a point at which accommodation would 'radically
restrict the operating latitude of the legislature."' Id at 259 (quoting Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)) (internal citations omitted).
75. Id at 259. But cf id. at 262 (Stevens, J. concurring) (placing the "burden of
demonstrating that there is a unique reason for allowing him a special exemption from a
valid law of general applicability" on the objector); see also id. at 263 n.3 (stating that "a
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However, this analysis would change about eight years later when the
Court decided Employment Division v. Smith."
In Smith, the Court abandoned the strict scrutiny analysis applied to
freedom of religion cases under the Free Exercise Clause.77 Smith
questioned whether using peyote for religious reasons was properly
prohibited under Oregon's criminal statute for illegal drug use."' The
Court found Oregon's statute constitutional and ruled that if a statute of
general applicability has a corollary effect on a religious belief, then First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause protection may not properly be
invoked.7 9 Therefore, the Court narrowed its analysis of Free Exercise
claims to accept neutral state statutes of general applicabilityt
The Court also analyzed the strict scrutiny analysis set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner" and discussed in United States v. Lee." Using a
"slippery slope" analysis, the Court concluded that the Sherbert strict
scrutiny test is most appropriately confined to unemployment
compensation cases." A strict scrutiny test, when used in the context of
First Amendment freedom of religion cases, would have the potential of
requiring exemptions from an overwhelming number of laws in our
84
religiously diverse society. The Court found such a policy
unacceptable.85 Accordingly, the majority discarded the use of a strict
standard that places an almost insurmountable burden on any individual who objects to a
valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes) better explains most of this
Court's holdings than does the standard articulated by the Court today).
76. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
77. Id. at 884-85.
78. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
79. -d. at 878-79 (stating that the Court has "never held that an individual's religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate").
80. Id. at 878-79, 884-85, 888-90. See also Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v.
Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 185-86 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2001) (summarizing the Smith
holding).
81. 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
82. See supra Part II.B.
83. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (stating that although the balancing test was sometimes
used to analyze Free Exercise Clause cases, the Court has "never applied the test to
invalidate [such a case]").
84. Id. at 888-89. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, commented:
Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost
every conceivable religious preference," and precisely because we value and
protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of
conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.
Id. at 888 (internal citations omitted).
85. Id. at 889.
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scrutiny test under the Free Exercise Clause when applied to an
otherwise valid law, and replaced it with a rational basis test.1
6
In Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission87 heard by the
Supreme Court of California, the petitioner argued both statutory and
constitutional grounds to support her religiously-based policy excluding
unmarried couples from renting her apartments.18 The Fair Employment
and Housing Commission argued that Smith's policy violated, among
other laws, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)."9
The court disposed of Smith's defense to the FEHA claim, finding that
the plain meaning of the statute included discrimination against
unmarried persons and, therefore, Smith violated the FEHA.90
Regarding Smith's First Amendment claim, the court ruled that
California's statutory bar of discrimination based on marital status was
"both generally applicable and neutral towards religion" 9' and, therefore,
did not violate Smith's First Amendment freedoms under the Free
92Exercise Clause.
86. Id. at 888. The Court concluded its opinion by affirming its departure from "a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs." Id at 890. Congress
reacted to the Court's ruling in Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) where it restored the Sherbert compelling interest test. Catholic Charities of
Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 186 n.4 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2001). The
Court later found the RFRA unconstitutional and reaffirmed its ruling under Smith. Id.
Some commentators have declared the Smith rational basis test to be "extremely
unfavorable to any litigant seeking to obtain an exemption from a statute based on
religious objections." Edward T. Mechmann, Illusion or Protection? Free Exercise Rights
and Laws Mandating Insurance Coverage of Contraception, 41 CATH. LAW. 145, 150
(2001).
87. 9t3 P.2d 909, 918 (Cal. 1996) (finding that a religious-based policy to refuse
apartment rentals to unmarried couples to be unconstitutional).
88. Id. at 912-13.
89. Id. at 913 n.1; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(a) (West 2003) (finding it unlawful
"[flor the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against ... any person
because of the ... marital status ... of that person"). Respondent also alleged that Smith
violated the California Civil Rights Act. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering 2003) (reading
"[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability or medical condition are
entitled to ... full and equal accommodations ... in all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever"). Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d at 91_3 n.2.
90. Id. at 914-15.
91. Id. at 919. The court noted that "[t]he law is generally applicable in that it
prohibits all discrimination without reference to motivation. The law is neutral in that its
object is to prohibit discrimination irrespective of reason not because it is undertaken for
religious reasons." Id. at 919.
92. Id at 919-21. The court also examined Smith's free exercise claim under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), an act of Congress later found
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. at 921-29. The court used a four-part
test under the RFRA to analyze Smith's invocation of the Free Exercise Clause:
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The decisions in Lee, Smith, and Fair Employment and Housing
Commission provide an important historical perspective to the future
interpretation of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and its
invocation in religious exemption cases. They also provide a clear
background to the freedom of religion arguments promulgated in
Catholic Charities.93 In that case, Catholic Charities also used a Free
Exercise claim against statutory mandated inclusion of prescription
contraceptives in its insurance plan. 4
III. IMPORTANT BILLS, REGULATIONS, AND CASES INFLUENCING THE
TREND TO FIND SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
A. Members of Congress Propose the Equity in Prescription Insurance
and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2001
Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME) introduced the Equity in Prescription
Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2001 (EPICC).95 The bill
focused on amending the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)96 to mandate that every group health plan covered by
ERISA include prescription contraceptives provided the plan covers
other FDA-approved prescription drugs. 97 EPICC's drafters also sought
(1) The burden must fall on a religious belief rather than on a philosophy or a
way of life. (2) The burdened religious belief must be sincerely held. (3) The
plaintiff must prove the burden is substantial or, in other words, legally
significant. (4) If all of the foregoing are true, the government must
"demonstrate[] that application of the burden to the person [f] ... is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and [ 1 . . . is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."
Id. at 922-23 (footnotes omitted). Using this test, the court found that Smith's claim failed
part three; she failed to prove a substantial burden on her ability to freely exercise her
religious freedoms. Id. at 923-29. Therefore, Smith's Free Exercise claim also failed, both
under the Federal Constitution and the California Constitution. Id. at 928-29.
93. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 176, 185
(Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2001) (advancing an Establishment Clause argument under the U.S. and
California Constitutions in addition to the Free Exercise Clause arguments).
94. Id. at 185-95.
95. Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2001
(EPICC), S. 104, 107th Congress (2001) (introduced by Senators Snowe, Reid, Warner,
Mikulski, Jeffords, Boxer, Specter, Murray, Collins, Johnson, Wellstone, Leahy, Durbin,
lnouye, Akaka, Sarbanes, Schumer, Harkin, Clinton, and Corzine). Senator Snowe
formerly introduced the Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act
of 1997, S. 743, 105th Congress (1997), but that bill was not well supported and EPICC was
re-introduced in 2001. See Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress, S. 743,
available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 9, 2003); see also Bill Summary &
Status for the 107th Congress, S. 104, available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 9,
2003).
96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
97. See EPICC, supra note 95, at §§ 3,714.
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to alleviate economic and basic health care burdens for prescription
contraceptive users.98 The Act's findings focus on the economic benefit
in preventing unwanted pregnancies and in allowing family planning.99 In
her law review article commenting on EPICC and the Erickson case,
author Julie L. Hatcher states that "the plan would protect physicians
from being penalized by a reduction in reimbursements from insurance
plans for prescribing contraceptive treatments."'00 EPICC's introduction
provides support for the proposition that Title VII protects prescription
contraceptive coverage.""
B. EEOC Delivers a Landmark Decision Based on Title VII
In December 2000, the EEOC found that two women (Charging
Parties A and B), both registered nurses, were subjected to sexual
discrimination by their respective employers (Respondents A and B)'12
when their insurance plans did not include prescription contraceptives.' 3
Charging Party A wanted coverage for use of oral contraceptives, 4 and
Charging Party B wanted coverage for Depo Provera, a prescription
contraceptive that is injected into the patient.' 5  Because each
prescription drug plan excluded prescription contraceptives "regardless
of intended use," the Commission concluded that the employers violated
98. Id. Among other things, EPICC's findings include:
(2) contraceptive services are part of basic health care, allowing families to both
adequately space desired pregnancies and avoid unintended pregnancy; (3)
studies show that contraceptives are cost effective: for every $1 of public funds
invested in family planning, $4 to $14 of public funds is saved in pregnancy and
health care-related costs; ... (5) unintended pregnancies lead to higher rates of
infant mortality, low-birth weight, and maternal morbidity, and threaten the
economic viability of families.
Id. at § 2.
99. Id.
100. Hatcher, supra note 1, at 215.
101. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1276 n.16 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (commenting that EPICC would surpass the reach of Title VII by requiring all
employers to include prescription contraceptives in their self-insured benefit plans, rather
than just those with fifteen or more employees).
102. See EEOC Decision, supra note 3 (determining that the EEOC had jurisdiction
because respondent met the definition of employers within Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e § 701(b) (2000)).
103. See id. Respondent A's "plan excludes coverage for prescription contraceptive
drugs and devices, whether they are used for birth control or for other medical purposes."
Id.
104. See id. Charging that Party A wanted to use birth control pills as a means of
contraception, but also to prevent against ovarian cancer and to ward off the symptoms of
pre-menstrual syndrome and dysmenorrhea (menstrual cramps). Id




Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). 6
The PDA protects pregnant women in the workplace from being treated
differently from those similarly situated, whether the disparate treatment
relates either to working conditions or the type of benefits extended by
the employer.'07 The PDA also protects women in the workplace who are
affected by medical conditions relating to pregnancy.108
In reaching its decision, the EEOC relied upon the Supreme Court's
determination that the PDA protects "a woman's potential for
pregnancy, as well as pregnancy itself. '0 9 Therefore, if contraception is
considered a means to self-regulate a woman's pregnancy potential, then
it would logically fall under the umbrella of the PDA." ° The EEOC
applied this reasoning to the facts presented by charging Parties A and B
106. See id. Respondent A is largely associated with Respondent B; therefore, their
prescription insurance plans are identical. Id.; see also Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (making it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his ... employment, because of such individual's ... sex").
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining women "affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions" as a class that must be protected from sexual discrimination).
Congress amended Title VII in reaction to the Supreme Court's "erroneous" decision in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1976) (holding that a policy excluding
coverage for pregnancy related disabilities was not sexually discriminatory under Title
VII). See also Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268-70 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (discussing the origins of sex discrimination coverage in Title VII, specifically as an
attempt by a Virginia Congressman to sabotage the law by adding such a controversial
subject as gender discrimination); Roth, supra note 1, at 783-84 (providing a background
to Title VII protections and the Act's role in the Erickson decision); see EEOC Decision,
supra note 3 (stating that the PDA bars employers from treating women who are pregnant
differently from other women who are similarly able or unable to work); Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983) (providing that "[t]he
Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes,
discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her
sex").
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); see also EEOC Decision, supra note 3.
109. See EEOC Decision, supra note 3 (citing Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
499 U.S. 187, 199, 211 (1991), that found that employer health insurance plans that
discriminate on the basis of a woman's potential to become pregnant are to be held "in the
same light as explicit sex discrimination").
110. Id. Opponents argue that there is a "potential danger" in the EEOC's decision.
See Mechmann, supra note 86, at 160. Mechmann counters the EEOC decision by
distinguishing the Church's position from sexual discrimination. Id. at 161. The author
argues that the Church's refusal to include contraceptives in its insurance coverage is
based solely on "morality-based employment policies." Id. Mechmann contends that
"[t]he Church does not provide employee benefits in situations that offend its moral
doctrine, regardless of whether it is being done by male or female employees or their
spouses." Id. at 161-62 (relying on Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410,
414-15 (6th Cir. 1996); Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir.
1999)). Finally, Mechmann supports the proposition that as long as the Church enforces
its moral principles in an even-handed way, it does not violate Title VII. See id. at 162.
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and found that their employers violated Title VII by excluding
prescription contraceptives from their health plans."' In finding sex
discrimination under these facts, the EEOC set the stage for the first
federal case holding that employers must include prescription birth
control and other contraceptives in their health plan to avoid committing
discrimination under Title VII. "
2
C First Impressions.- A Washington Federal Court is the First to Rule
After the EEOC's 2000 Decision
In seeking redress for claims of disparate treatment and disparate
impact, the plaintiff in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co. relied on Title VII to
force her employer to include contraceptives in its coverage plan-an
issue of first impression in the federal court system.'3 After a discussion
of the relevant case law, the court in Erickson declared:
The PDA is not a begrudging recognition of a limited grant of
rights to a strictly defined group of women who happen to be
pregnant. Read in the context of Title VII as a whole, it is a
broad acknowledgement of the intent of Congress to outlaw any
and all discrimination against any and all women in the terms
and conditions of their employment, including the benefits an
employer provides to its employees . . . . The special or
increased healthcare needs associated with a woman's unique
sex-based characteristics must be met to the same extent, and
on the same terms, as other healthcare needs.
' 14
The court then invalidated all six arguments advanced by the
defendant Bartell Drug."5 Argument five, most pertinent to this Note,
111. EEOC Decision, supra note 3. The EEOC stated:
[P]rescription contraceptives are available only for women. As a result,
Respondents' explicit refusal to offer insurance coverage for them is, by
definition, a sex-based exclusion. Because 100 percent of the people affected by
Respondent's policy are members of the same protected group-here, women -
Respondent's policy need not specifically refer to that group in order to be
facially discriminatory [under Title VII].
Id.
112. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276-77.
113. Id. at 1275-76; Hatcher, supra note t, at 213.
114. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270-72 (adding that "[elven if one were to assume
that Bartell's prescription plan was not the result of intentional discrimination, the
exclusion of women-only benefits from . . . [the] plan is sex discrimination under Title
VIl).
115. Id. at 1272-76. The defendant argued that: (1) contraceptives are not a true
"healthcare" issue; (2) the PDA does not cover women's control over their own
reproductive cycles; (3) employers must have the ability to control costs of benefits such as
health insurance coverage; (4) the insurance plan was facially neutral; (5) Title VII is
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questioned the wisdom and timing of the court in ruling on an issue of
first impression regarding Title VII when the Act had existed for thirty-
seven years."6 Along with the other arguments, the court struck down
the defendant's position citing the December 2000 EEOC decision and
the court's similar interpretation of Title VII" 7
The court concluded its analysis by stating that, although an issue of
first impression, the plaintiff properly invoked Title VII and the PDA,
and was entitled to equal treatment under her employer's insurance
plan."" In short, coverage must include prescription contraceptives." 9 In
making such a ruling, the Erickson court foreshadowed the ruling in
Catholic Charities, a case dealing with another issue of first impression
regarding prescription contraceptive coverage.""
inapplicable in invalidating an employer's exclusion of contraceptives from its insurance
plan on sex discrimination grounds; and (6) the legislature, not the court, should rule on
this issue. Id.
116. Id. at 1275 (answering the defendant's "justifiabl[e]" question by noting that this
case was the first challenge to the exclusion of contraceptives from employer insurance
plans). The court commented on, but did not analyze, the absence of litigation on this
issue before Erickson. Id. In 1998, author Sylvia Law theorized that the failure to bring
Title VII claims against employers concerning prescription contraceptive coverage was
due to both the inability to gain access to understandable information about insurance
plans and a lack of financial backing to pursue Title VII claims as an issue of first
impression. Law, supra note 31, at 386.
117. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275-76 (holding that the EEOC's "overall
interpretation of Title VII comports with this court's construction of the Act and has led
the Commission to the same conclusion reached by this court").
118. Id. at 1277 (finding that "the exclusion of prescription contraceptives creates a
gaping hole in the coverage offered to female employees, leaving a fundamental and
immediate healthcare need uncovered").
119. Id.
120. In the wake of Erickson, other women filed complaints with their employers to
gain access to prescription contraceptives in their insurance plans. For example, a federal
judge recently granted class action status to plaintiffs in a claim against Wal-Mart, alleging
that Wal-Mart's employee health insurance coverage is sexually discriminatory by not
including prescription contraceptives. See Suit vs. Wal-Mart Made Class Action, at CBS
NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/31/health/printable520436.shtml (Aug. 31,
2002). George Stein, an attorney representing the Wal-Mart employee who originally
filed the suit, stated that Wal-Mart saves five million dollars a month by denying its
employees birth control coverage. Id. The Washington Post reported that in August 2002,
George Washington University agreed to expand coverage in its prescription insurance
plan to cover contraceptives. Amy Argetsinger & Avram Goldstein, supra note 30, at B2.
One of the school's students was "distressed to learn at campus orientation last year that
the student health plan covered abortions but not contraceptives, [stating,] '[i]t didn't
make sense."' Id. According to the school's General Counsel, GWU changed its insurance
plan in response to student demand rather than a specific complaint alleging sex
discrimination. Id. George Washington's Associate General Counsel, Richard A.
Weitzner, stated that the previous plan excluded prescription contraceptives because they
were "inconsistent with the purpose of the plan, which is to protect against major medical
issues." Id. See also Bergin, supra note 1, at 157-58 (proposing that the protections of
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IV. A TIMELY RELIGIOUS ARGUMENT: CATHOLIC CHARITIES SEEKS A
"CONSCIENCE CLAUSE" EXCEPTION FROM CALIFORNIA'S PRO-
CONTRACEPTION STATUTES
Catholic Charities arose out of a religious objection 21 to California's
Women's Contraception Equity Act, which required employers to
include contraceptives in their prescription insurance plans. 22 The
petitioner, Catholic Charities, was a religiously-based public benefit
corporation that provided social services without regard to its clients'
religious beliefs." 3  Similarly, Catholic Charities had a
nondenominational hiring policy."4
In this case, the respondent was the Superior Court of Sacramento
County, the court that denied Catholic Charities its preliminary,
declaratory, and injunctive relief."' In its appeal, Catholic Charities
sought redress from the Superior Court's ruling.'26 Catholic Charities
hoped to continue to provide its employees with a prescription insurance
plan that excludes coverage of contraceptives.12  Such a plan directly
defied California law.'
28
On July 2, 2001, the Court of Appeal of California issued a unanimous
opinion written by Principal Judge Scotland.129 The court carefully and
thoroughly analyzed the arguments advanced by Catholic Charities
under the U.S. and California Constitutions.'30  After a detailed
discussion, the court of appeal specifically rejected each of Catholic
Title IX should be invoked to protect college-age women, a group the article terms "least
likely to be insured").
121. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 176, 181
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001). The court summarized Catholic Charities' fundamental religious
objection as a belief that "the use of contraception is extrinsically evil and a grave sin,"
including any conduct making contraception available for others to use. Id. Further,
according to the Petitioner's argument, simply withdrawing insurance coverage for its
employees also violates Catholic teaching in that an employer is required to furnish its
employees with sufficient healthcare. Id at 184. In coming full circle, Catholic Charities
argues that there is no available alternative other than injunctive relief. Id.
122. Id. at 181 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (Deering 2003); CAL.
INS. CODE § 10123.196 (Deering 2003)). Here, because Catholic Charities does not offer a
disability insurance plan to its employees, only CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25
applies. Id. at 184-85 n.3.
123. Id. at 181.





128. Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (Deering 2003) and CAL.
INS. CODE § 10123.196 (Deering 2003)).
129. Id.
130. Id at 185-206.
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Charities' arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision. 31 Catholic
Charities appealed the case yet again-this time to the Supreme Court of
California-and was granted its petition for review on September 26,
2001.132
When analyzing the central issue in Catholic Charities, the California
Court of Appeal balanced the state's interest and reasoning in passing
the California statute with the fundamental religious freedoms of a
Catholic public corporation.' The court began by examining the
legislative history of the California statute and determining that, on its
face, the statute was enacted to protect women's basic healthcare needs,
as well as their social and economic status. 3 4  In short, the legislature
sought to eradicate gender discrimination while promoting women's
stature in society.3 3 The court noted that the California legislature
included a narrowly drawn3 6 "conscience clause" provision mainly at the
demand of Catholic groups.'37 Ironically, Catholic Charities could not
take advantage of this "conscience clause" exception due to its generally
131. Id. at 206 (using a de novo standard for the constitutional arguments).
132. Catholic Charities of Sacramento Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 31
P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001).
133. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 181-84 (describing the state's reasons for
enacting the statute and the substance of Catholic Charities' complaint).
134. Id. at 181-83.
135. See id. at 182. In delivering the opinion, Principal Justice Scotland commented
that "prescription contraceptives statistically are the most effective methods of birth
control and are an essential part of women's healthcare during their [reproductive] years."
Id. at 181. The court further noted that "[m]ainly due to th[e] exclusion [of contraceptives
from insurance plans], women pay 63 to 68 percent higher out-of-pocket healthcare costs
than men." Id. at 182. The court also referred to the State's legislative findings, which
showed that "in order for women to achieve and maintain economic and social parity and
independence, it is essential that they have the ability to reliably control their reproductive
capacity." Id.
136. Id. at 188-89. The court stated that a "conscience clause" exception from the
prescription contraceptive coverage mandate is only acceptable under the Establishment
Clause if it is "neutral toward religion and among religions." Id at 189.
137. Id. at 183 (stating that Catholic groups lobbied the legislature for such an
exception throughout the legislative process). But see Petition for Review at 7 n.6,
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (No. C037025) (arguing that the California legislature intentionally drafted the
"conscience clause" so that Catholic employers would be excluded from it). The
"conscience clause" exception required "religious employers" to meet four elements: "(A)
The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity. [j] (B) The entity primarily
employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity. [ ] (C) The entity serves
primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the entity. [ ] (D) The entity is a
nonprofit organization." Id Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d., at 183 (quoting CAL.
HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1367.25; CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196). The court noted that the
applicable state statutes also require such employers to provide notice to potential
employees that, due to religious reasons, they do not offer coverage for contraceptive
health care services. Id. at 183 n.2.
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secular mission, the varying religious faiths of its employees and clients,
and its business structure.'38 Because Catholic Charities could not make
use of the statutory exception, it had to include contraceptives in its
insurance plan, thus violating its religious beliefs.'39 At that point, the
corporation filed suit in the California court system, charging that the
statute's exclusionary language violated the First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause as well as the Establishment Clause of both the U.S. and
California Constitutions. 140
A. The Free Exercise Clause Under the Federal Constitution -Strict
Scrutiny Denied
Following the Free Exercise Clause analysis set forth in United States
v. Lee, Employment Division v. Smith, and Smith v. Fair Employment &
Housing Commission, the court in Catholic Chaities performed a
detailed analysis of the Petitioner's Free Exercise Clause claim.14 ' The
analysis focused on the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Employment
Division v. Smith and summarized the holding:
[S]trict scrutiny does not apply to all free exercise challenges.
An otherwise valid and constitutional law in an area in which
the state is free to regulate, which law is neutral and of general
applicability, need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of•• 142
burdening a particular religious practice.
Using the Smith framework, the court in Catholic Charities again
examined the California statute's legitimate purpose in preventing
138. Id. at 183 (holding that Catholic Charities does not meet any of the four criteria
necessary to qualify for the narrowly defined religious employer exception).
139. See supra Part L.A (discussing Humanae Vitae, Evangelium Vitae, and the NCCB
directives, which call for bans on contraception and abortion).
140. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 184. Catholic Charities relied on Church
of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), to argue that the
restrictive terms of the "conscience clause" demanded a strict scrutiny standard of review.
Id. at 190. The court used Lukumifor the proposition that "a law is not neutral, and thus
is subject to heightened scrutiny, 'if the object of [the] law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation .... .' Id. (alteration in original). The
court, following the procedures set forth in Lukumi again examined legislative history to
determine whether a malice-tainted objective existed in the Women's Contraceptive
Equity Act, and found that the honest intentions of the California legislature distinguished
this statute from being unconstitutional. Id. at 190-92. The court found the statute was
drafted to address women's health and economic well-being, and to allow them needed
control over their reproductive cycles. Id. at 181-82. In drafting the statute, the legislature
did allow for a limited exemption for religious employers, but it was constitutional in that
it treated all employers in the same limited way. Id. at 190-91.
141. See supra Part II.B.
142. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 185-86.
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gender discrimination and promoting the basic healthcare needs of
women, and its "conscience clause" exception.4 ' The court recognized
that the California statute was a valid law of both neutral and general
applicability.1 4 4 Therefore, the statute did not require a strict scrutiny test
of its constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause.145  The court
rejected Catholic Charities' argument that the limited language of the
"conscience clause" specifically targeted the Catholic religion. 14  If the
exception only applied to Catholic employers, because Catholicism is the
only religion that forbids contraceptive use, then Catholic employers
would exclusively benefit from it, regardless of the narrow drafting of the
California statute.14' Because the California statute was generally
applicable and neutral under the federal Free Exercise Clause, the court
turned its attention to the California Constitution.
148
143. Id. at 187. The court found the "conscience clause" exception at issue here to be
narrowly drawn for a legitimate and recognizable purpose: the legislature correctly
believed that a more broadly drawn religious exemption could permit more employers to
escape the statute's reach. Id. at 189. The court reasoned that the employees of the
exempted parties would feel the ultimate harm in this more inclusive approach. Id. They
would suffer from having their employer's religious beliefs forced upon them in the realm
of healthcare. Id. Therefore, the California legislature drafted the "conscience clause"
exception to mainly apply to religious employers whose employees share the same faith.
Id. In so doing, a particular employer's religious beliefs will have a limited effect on its
employees. Id.
144. Id. at 188-89 (evidencing the statute's general application by noting that
California employers are not required to provide contraceptive coverage in all
circumstances, but only if they choose to offer prescription coverage to their employees).
145. Id. at 186 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); see also id. at
187 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (reproductive freedom); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (same); Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760
(Cal. 1985) (same); Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996) (public health);
EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (gender discrimination);
EEOC Decision, supra note 3 (finding sex discrimination under Title VII when employers
exclude prescription contraceptives from their employee insurance plans)). Catholic
Charities relied on EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), to rebut the
authoritative weight of the EEOC's recent decision. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 188. The court invalidated that argument, relying on a federal court's adoption of the
pertinent EEOC decision in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D.
Wash. 2001). Id; see also discussion supra Part III.C.
146. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 189-90.
147. Id. at 191. Catholic Charities alleged:
[The statute] is not facially neutral because (1) only the Catholic Church has a
core teaching against artificial contraception and also operates an extensive
network of hospitals, schools, and social service agencies; (2) only Catholic
employers were discussed specifically during the legislative process; and (3) only
the Catholic Church opposed the enactment of the statutes.
Id.
148. Id. at 193. The court also invalidated Catholic Charities' argument that relied on
Lukumi, that a Sherbert strict scrutiny standard was necessary because the California
legislature allowed for a religiously-based "conscience clause" exemption in its statute
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B. California's Free Exercise Clause - Is It More Inclusive Than the
Federal Constitution ?
Catholic Charities crafted an isolated argument strictly under the
California Constitution in another attempt to invalidate the state
statute. '49 This argument distinguished the California Constitution's Free
Exercise Clause from its federal counterpart due to the former's
breadth."5  Catholic Charities maintained that "the interpretation of
[California's] free exercise clause is not dependent upon the manner in
which the corresponding federal clause has been applied." 5' When
applying the California Constitution, Catholic Charities argued that the
court should apply a strict scrutiny test against the statute in question.' s'
Through precedent, the court demonstrated that the Supreme Court of
California had never definitively ruled that the state's Establishment
Clause should be interpreted differently than the prevailing federal
standard.'53 The state's supreme court formerly identified the California
(though not required by law to do so). Id. at 192-93. The court answered this argument by
noting its policy implications: if the legislature had to satisfy a strict scrutiny test for each
religious exemption incorporated into statutory law, no matter how neutral and generally
applicable the exemption was drawn, the legislature would be much less likely to include
religious exemptions. Id. Similarly, the court rejected Catholic Charities' reliance on a
"ministerial exception" because a public benefit corporation does not meet the requisite
"clergy" member standard and thereby the court cannot be forced to refrain from
"encroaching on the ability of a church to manage its internal affairs." Id. at 193-94; see
also EEOC v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding employer's
denial of employee's application for tenure was a result of sex discrimination under Title
VII). Lastly, the court struck down Catholic Charities' "hybrid rights" claim. Catholic
Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 194-95. Such an argument required the claiming party to
combine its valid Free Exercise Clause argument with another argument. Id. Here,
Catholic Charities failed to establish a "colorable" First Amendment freedom of speech or
Establishment Clause claim; therefore, its invocation of a "hybrid rights" argument was
invalid. Id. (quoting Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999)).
149. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 195-96.
150. Id. at 195-96 n.5. The court included the pertinent parts of the California
Constitution, "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or
preference are guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are
licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The Legislature shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion." Id. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.").
151. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 195 (noting Catholic Charities' reliance
on Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 12 Cal. 4th 1143,1177 (1996)).
152. Id. at 196.
153. Id. The court rejected Catholic Charities' reliance on California v. Woody, 61
Cal. 2d 716 (1964) (holding that California courts should follow federal Constitution
interpretations using a strict scrutiny standard), because that case was later overruled by
the rational basis test of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Catholic
Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 196 (recognizing that "[b]ecause Woody simply applied the
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Constitution as "a document of independent force," but had never before
applied its Free Exercise Clause in such a way.14 The court summarized,
"Unless and until the California Supreme Court rules otherwise, the
application of the [rational basis] rule enunciated in Smith . . . is
consistent with protections afforded by the free exercise clause of
California's Constitution."'55  Thus, the California Court of Appeal
begged the question: will the Supreme Court of California's ruling on this
issue distinguish Catholic Charities, and rule that a strict scrutiny test is
applicable under the California Constitution?
C The Establishment Clause as Jointly Interpreted by the Federal
Constitution and the California Constitution
Catholic Charities invoked the Establishment Clause of both the U.S.
and California Constitutions in its third attempt to disprove the validity
of the "conscience clause" exception in the California statute.' The
court concurrently analyzed the claim's applicability to both constitutions
because their meanings do not materially differ.' Specifically, Catholic
Charities claimed that the Establishment Clause barred the California
statute's narrow exception because it excluded the Catholic religion over
others."' According to Catholic Charities, the statute's exception
involved a "facial preference" for other religions that lacked the breadth
of auxiliary organizations of the Catholic Church. 9 Such Catholic
auxiliary organizations, including Catholic Charities itself, did not easily
meet the definition of a "religious employer" within the statute, causing
then-existing federal standard of review .... Catholic Charities's reliance on Woody is
misplaced").
154. Id. (citing Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 12 Cal. 4th at 1177). The court
concluded, "The fact California's Constitution offers broader protection does not
ineluctably lead to the conclusion that neutral laws of general application must be
subjected to the compelling interest test [rather than the rational basis test of Employment
Division v. Smith]." Id. at 197-98 (citing also Ex Parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678 (1861), and
Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 232 (1945) as precedent that if the
California Constitution were applied as an instrument completely severed from the federal
Constitution and its interpretations, that its language still "acknowledges that one's
religious freedom may be curtailed in certain instances for the public good as long as the
curtailment is not discriminatory").
155. Id. at 199 (citation omitted).
156. Id. at 199-206.
157. Id. at 199 n.6 (citing East Bay v. California, 24 Cal. 4th 693, 718-19 (2000), to
prove that "California's Establishment Clause offers no more protection than that of the
federal Constitution").
158. Id. at 199.
159. Id. (indicating that Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), sets forth the
appropriate strict scrutiny test when a statute includes a "facial preference between
religions").
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them to fall outside its "conscience clause" exception."6 For that reason,
Catholic Charities argued for a strict scrutiny test, requiring a
"compelling state interest," instead of a rational basis standard.1 6 ' The
161
court disagreed.
In its ruling, the court distinguished Catholic Charities' reliance on
Larson v. Valente l63 from the facts of the instant case.' 64 The Court noted
that the statute in Larson involved a discriminatory purpose, in allowing
a "conscience clause" exemption for those religious groups whose
members funded more than half their budget, thereby, excluding less
established religions. ' In contrast, the Catholic Charities court relied on
its earlier analysis and reiterated that the California statute is both
neutral and generally applicable.'66  Therefore, Catholic Charities'
argument for a strict scrutiny test to apply to its Establishment Clause
claim was denied.
167
Having dispensed with the strict scrutiny argument, the court
proceeded with its Establishment Clause analysis under the three-part
Lemon test.16  According to Lemon, "to withstand an Establishment
Clause challenge, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its
primary purpose must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and the
statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with
160. See supra notes 146-47 (describing the statutory definition of "religious
employer").
16 1. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 200.
162. Id. at 201 (stating "the language of the religious employer exemption in the
prescription contraceptive coverage statutes is sect-neutral").
163. See generally Larson, 456 U.S. at 228 (finding a Minnesota statute imposing
registration and reporting requirements of only religious organizations soliciting more
than fifty percent of funds from nonmembers unconstitutional under the First
Amendment Establishment Clause).
164. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 200.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text (describing the Women's
Contraception Equity Act).
167. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 201. The court concluded, "Larson is of
no assistance to Catholic Charities. It simply 'indicates that laws discriminating among
religions are subject to strict scrutiny . . .and that laws 'affording a uniform benefit to all
religions' should be analyzed under Lemon .... ' Id. at 200 (citing Corp. of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987)).
Catholic Charities raised another argument in its attempt to prove that "conscience
clause" exemption was not neutral in its application. Id at 201-02. Relying on Mitchell v.
Helms, 430 U.S. 793 (2000), Catholic Charities argued that the "pervasively sectarian"
doctrine forbids a legislative body from deciding for itself the various religious and secular
branches of a particular religion. Id. The court dismissed this argument because the only
binding portion of Mitchells plurality opinion was its holding, and because the two cases
were factually distinguishable. Id. at 202-03.
168. Id. at 203 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
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religion."' 69  Relying mainly on its previous analysis of the California
statute's neutrality towards religion,' the Court found that Catholic
Charities' argument failed part one of the Lemon test.'
The court determined that Catholic Charities' argument also failed
part two of the Lemon test because its religious practice was not
improperly inhibited.'72 The court concluded that "[b]eing compelled to
provide [prescription contraceptive] coverage cannot be viewed as
endorsing the use of contraceptives; to the contrary, the organization
remains free to advise its employees that it is morally opposed to
prescription contraceptive methods and to counsel them to refrain from
using such methods."'73 Such a dismissive ruling on this prong of the
Lemon test may be hotly debated by Catholic Charities and the Catholic
community as a whole; however, the court found its opinion sufficient to
find against Catholic Charities on this factor.
74
The court similarly dismissed Catholic Charities' argument on part
three of the Lemon test and, consequently, its entire claim.7 7 This part of
the Lemon test involved the prohibition of excessive government
entanglement with religion. 76  The court concluded that such
169. Id.
170. See supra text and accompanying notes 144-46 (summarizing the court's analysis
as determining that the California statute is generally neutral in its application, and
ratifying its legitimate aims of preventing sex discrimination and promoting healthcare for
women).
171. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 203.
172. Id. at 203-04.
173. Id. at 204. The court continues:
For us to conclude otherwise would mean that such a provider of secular services
could impose its own religious views on its employees by refusing to provide
them with health coverage that is available to the employees of other entities
performing secular services. That, we think, is not what the Establishment
Clause stands for.
Id.
174. Hogan, supra note 27. Hogan writes, "It is illicit for Catholic Charities, as a part
of the Catholic Church in the Diocese of Sacramento, to provide contraceptive coverage
to its employees, and it is immoral to deprive [its] employees of pharmaceutical benefits in
order to avoid the conflict." Id. The court in Catholic Charities seemed to dismiss
summarily this conflict in prong two without pausing for a deeper analysis. See supra Part
L.A (describing Catholic teaching in the Evangelium Vitae as requiring a conscientious
objection to any civil law that opposes moral law). In her 1998 article, Sylvia A. Law
similarly simplified the potential conflict for religious employers who face the mandatory
inclusion of prescription contraceptives in their employee insurance plans. Law, supra
note 31, at 386. Law wrote that, "neither employers who provide coverage for
contraceptive services nor their employees are required as a result of that financial
contribution to use contraception themselves." Id
175. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 204-06.
176. Id. at 204-05 (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 204
Cal. Ct. App. 3d 1269, 1288 (1998), aff'd, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)). The California courts
2003] 1109
Catholic University Law Review
entanglement did not exist because the state need not interfere with a
religious employer at all, unless the employer argued the applicability of
the statute's exemption. 177 In that case, the state must accept the
employer's religious objection to issuing contraceptive coverage without
question. 7' Next, the state must conduct a limited, mainly statistical,
inquiry into the religious make-up of the employer's services, employees,
and customer base and conduct a legal investigation of the employer's
tax status.79 For the foregoing reasons, the court found that Catholic
Charities' claim under the Lemon test failed, and that the California
statute was valid under the U.S. and California Constitutions.' 8
The court concluded by affirming the superior court's denial of
Catholic Charities' motion for preliminary declaratory and injunctive
relief."" The effect of the court's ruling is that Catholic Charities must
include contraceptive coverage in its prescription insurance plan during
the pendency and eventual conclusion of its trial. However, because the
standard of review is whether it is "reasonably probable" that the
petitioner will "prevail on the merits," the Court of Appeal's decision
provides a clear forecast of the ultimate decision reached by the trial
court. 18 Similarly, if the Supreme Court of California affirms the Court
of Appeal's decision, it is more likely that the trial court will find against
Catholic Charities. 83
previously interpreted excessive entanglement to mean "where religious and state
employees must work closely together to work out the statutory scheme, when the state
becomes involved in scrutinizing religious content or when enforcement requires
government investigators to . . . engage in surveillance of the religious organization to
ensure a secular purpose is served." Id. at 205. The court summarized previous
interpretations of excessive entanglement as involving "a distinction between regulatory
action that requires ongoing government supervision and that which requires a limited
inquiry." Id. (citing DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 169-170 (2d Cir. 1993)).
177. Id. Catholic Charities argued that the California statute did require excessive
entanglement regarding enforcement of its "conscience clause" exemption because "the
state must undertake prolonged monitoring and 'engage in rendering theological
judgments' in doing so. Id. at 205. The court also dismissed Catholic Charities' claim
that the definition of a "religious employer" under the California statute's exception was
too vague to apply. Id at 206.
178. Id. at 205 (articulating the rule that "the state must accept an entity's assertion
that contraception is contrary to its religious tenets").
179. Id.
180. Id. at 206. The court also dismissed Catholic Charities' claim that the definition
of a "religious employer" under the California statute's exemption was too vague to apply.
Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 181.
183. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001)
(authorizing California Supreme Court review of the Catholic Charities case).
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V. THE LONG REACH OF CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF SACRAMENTO, INC.
V. SUPERIOR COURT: A CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED OPINION AND ITS
SOCIETAL IMPACTS
A. A Majority Opinion of Finely Detailed Analysis- the Unanimous
Rule Against Catholic Charities
In Catholic Charities, the court issued a well-crafted and thorough
opinion. Each of Catholic Charities' arguments was analyzed using well-
established precedent, including seminal U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and Supreme Court of California
cases.1 84 The opinion also reflected a shift in the legal approach
respecting women's unique reproductive abilities.'85
The Catholic Charities opinion recognizes the inherent biological
difference between men and women-the ability to reproduce-a
difference that must be reflected and protected in our laws."' Drawing
this distinction in the courts reflects society's acceptance of the economic
and societal burdens placed solely on women due to their unique abilityto bea ,.H 187
to bear children. The court's recognition creates greater societal
latitude in enabling women to have control over their reproductive
choices. Regarding this biological distinction, author and professor
Sylvia A. Law wrote, "Nature demands that women alone bear the
physical burdens of pregnancy, but society, through the law, can either
mitigate or exaggerate the cost of these burdens. ' 8  The court in
Catholic Charities exercised its power to enable women access to
prescription contraceptives and, more importantly, to promote equality
through reproductive control.'89 Because the opinion is well crafted,
legally sound, and supports an important societal shift regarding
women's reproductive control, the Supreme Court of California will
likely affirm the Court of Appeal's decision.
184. See supra Part II.
185. Cf Law, supra note 31, at 386 (discussing the historic lack of Title VII challenges
to exclusion of prescription contraceptives from employee insurance plans).
186. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,
955 (1984) (stating that "an equality doctrine that denies the reality of biological
difference in relation to reproduction reflects an idea about personhood that is
inconsistent with people's actual experience of themselves and the world").
187. Id. at 956 ("Pregnancy and childbirth are ... burdensome to health, mobility,
independence, and sometimes to life itself, and women are profoundly disadvantaged in
that they alone bear these burdens.").
188. Id. at 1016.
189. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 176,
206 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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B. The Impact of Catholic Charities on the Vast Network of Catholic
Auxiliary Organizations
Catholic hospitals are the largest not-for-profit providers of health care
in America.'9 " Though Catholic Charities is not technically a hospital, it
is a social services organization whose customers are the "poor, disabled,
elderly, and otherwise vulnerable members of society."' 9' These two
groups, Catholic hospitals and social services organizations, are similar
because they both abide by the "Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services" issued by the NCCB. 92 Those directives
forbid the distribution of contraceptives.'93
The Catholic Charities opinion may impact the far reach of the
Catholic health care and social services system; if the Supreme Court of
California affirms that opinion, that impact will be even greater. As
Humane Vitae, Evangelium Vitae, and the NCCB directives indicate,
well-established Catholic doctrine forbids its auxiliary institutions from
providing contraceptives to its customers and its employees.'94 In ruling
that Catholic Charities must include contraceptives in its prescription
insurance plan, the court has left the organization with no choice. By
whatever action it takes, Catholic Charities must defy either its religious
or legal obligations. As a result, it and similarly situated public benefit
corporations may react by attempting to meet the California statutes'
definition of "religious employer,"'9' or they may withdraw prescription
190. Alison Manolovici Cody, Success in New Jersey. Using the Charitable Trust
Doctrine to Preserve Women's Reproductive Services When Hospitals Become Catholic,
57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 323, 327 (2000) (reporting statistics including that "[tihe
Catholic church controls approximately 600 hospitals nationwide, which translates into
140,000 beds, $40 billion in revenues, and 15% of all hospital care"). The author also
stated that "[ijn 1996, five Catholic health care systems were counted among the nation's
ten largest systems." Id.
191. Catholic Charities, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181.
192. See NCCB, supra note 25.
193. Id. at No. 52; see also Hogan, supra note 27. Hogan, recognizing that the Catholic
Church sees this as a matter of religious freedom, wrote:
The Catholic Church views itself as the hands and feet of Jesus in the world, and
as such, has created affiliated institutions such as Catholic Charities [and]
Catholic hospitals ... in order to fulfill that mission. Catholics believe that their
work for charity and justice is not something separate, but integral to worship-in-
fact ....
Id.; see Carol Hogan, A Matter of Religious Freedom, available at
http://www.dioceseofmonterey.org/freedom.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2002).
194. See NCCB, supra note 25, at No. 52; Pope Paul VI, supra note 15; Pope John Paul
11, supra note 22; supra notes 16-19, 22-26.
195. See supra notes 137-38 (defining "religious employer" under the applicable
California statute).
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insurance coverage altogether. The ultimate course of action remains to
be seen.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of how Catholic auxiliary organizations in California will
react to the court's upcoming decision remains unresolved. Although the
court of appeal's decision relies on well-established legal principles
regarding the U.S. and California Constitutions, the policy issues
surrounding the case may give the Supreme Court of California pause.
Each party in the case presents compelling positions; one argues the need
for legislative recognition of religious freedoms, and the other argues for
freedom regarding reproductive control. The religious, societal, and
healthcare issues brought forth in Catholic Charities will be impacted by
the Supreme Court of California's decision. The only questions
remaining are when and how.
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